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ABSTRACT 
  This Note identifies a discrepancy in the law governing the 
decisionmaking that directs patient care. Seeking treatment that a third 
party will pay for, a patient needs not only a physician-prescribed 
course of treatment but also an insurer’s verification that the cost is 
medically necessary or otherwise covered by the patient’s plan. Both 
of these decisions directly impact the ultimate care delivered to the 
patient, but are governed by two very different liability regimes. A 
patient who suffers an adverse outcome may sue his physician in tort, 
while a patient who suffers from a lack of coverage may generally sue 
his insurer only under contract. In other words, when a patient suffers 
from inadequate care, his potential remedies vary considerably 
depending on whether the physician or the insurer is the defendant. 
  This discrepancy in liability is the consequence of the federal law 
governing the administration of employer-sponsored health plans, 
and its extensive preemption of related state law. Many commentators 
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have called for legal reform to address the distortion of managed care 
liability that results, arguing that managed care liability must be 
consistent or that wronged beneficiaries must have access to 
meaningful remedies. This Note argues that the federal law governing 
managed care organizations is problematic for a different reason and 
that the first step toward reform may be more elementary than 
previously suggested. Specifically, it suggests that the law governing 
insurers’ coverage decisions is inconsistent with the law governing 
treatment recommendations. Patients suffer the same harm from error 
in both contexts—but because they can recover substantially more 
from treating physicians, doctors are named as defendants even when 
the insurers make errors. Further, this Note argues that simply 
aligning these two standards might offer a gateway to reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Health-care costs ultimately arise from the accumulation of 
individual decisions doctors make about which services and 
treatments to write an order for. The most expensive piece of 
medical equipment, as the saying goes, is a doctor’s pen. 
—Atul Gawande1 
If the most expensive piece of medical equipment is the doctor’s 
pen, then it is the stroke of this pen that is driving the American 
health care system into the ground. Collectively, the nation spends 
over two trillion dollars every year to provide mediocre medical care 
to only a segment of the population.2 Individually, Americans pay 
premiums that are increasing four times faster than inflation.3 These 
ghastly fees go straight to third-party payers, most of whom “manage” 
care in an attempt to rein in the doctor’s pen and contain costs that 
are now unsustainable.4 Predictably, one of the most effective ways to 
curb medical costs is to disagree with the doctor and simply refuse to 
cover the treatment his pen prescribes. 
 
 1. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health 
Care, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 40. 
 2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 25 (2009) (noting that annual health care 
spending amounts to almost eight thousand dollars per person). 
 3. Kevin Sack, Necessary Medicine?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at 
1. 
 4. Managed care is a unique type of insurance administration designed to reduce health 
care spending. See infra Part I. 
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When an insurer and a doctor disagree, the former usually wins: 
most people have health insurance precisely because they cannot 
afford the treatments they will need when they fall ill. Yet when a 
patient forgoes a denied treatment and later discovers that his doctor 
was right, he—or his estate—will likely seek a remedy for the harm he 
has suffered from this lack of care. Ironically, it is his doctor, and not 
his insurer, who most often pays the price. 
This legal anomaly has been the subject of much debate; 
managed care organizations serve to contain costs by allocating 
treatments, but generally escape liability even when they fail to 
exercise due care in determining the medical necessity of one.5 The 
Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)6 
preempts any state-imposed liability for employer-sponsored health 
plans relating to the administration of health benefits, but does not 
impose parallel federal liability in its place.7 As a result, most patients 
receive health care benefits from plans that are not subject to 
common or state law standards of care, and that offer no replacement 
recovery scheme for wronged beneficiaries. Managed care liability 
reform has been the outcry—to no avail—of many health law scholars 
who bemoan both the inconsistent legal regime that extensive state 
law preemption creates8 as well as the dearth of remedies it leaves to 
wronged plaintiffs.9 
 
 5. Extensive federal preemption applies to most managed care organizations, exempting 
them from liability under state laws. See infra Part II. 
 6. The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 
(2006). 
 7. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); see also infra Part II. 
 8. See, e.g., Gail B. Agrawal & Mark H. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? 
Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 238 n.14 (2003) 
(“Within this patchwork system, it is nearly impossible to answer legal questions concerning 
managed care liability with any level of generality, other than ‘it depends.’” (quoting Peter J. 
Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed 
Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 767, 768 n.2 (2001))); Linda P. McKenzie, 
Eligibility, Treatment, or Something In-Between? Plaintiffs Get Creative to Get Past ERISA 
Preemption, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 272, 295–300 (2007) (discussing the pleading 
strategies used to avoid ERISA preemption). 
 9. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix 
It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 535 (2003) (arguing that a 
reinterpretation of ERISA as it applies to health care would reduce the perceived need for a 
patients’ bill of rights); Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: 
Reflections on Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 253, 265 (2005) (noting that ERISA’s provision allowing beneficiaries to seek injunction 
to enforce benefits is inadequate because “[i]t is unrealistic to expect patients who are sick and 
in need of rapid treatment to go to federal court to make sure that their health plans make 
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This Note provides an additional rationale for reform, arguing 
that the status quo of managed care liability is untenable because it is 
inconsistent with liability governing physicians. In medicine, contract 
and tort liability intersect and differently govern the conduct of two 
parties providing care to one patient. This Note illustrates that the 
imposition of these disparate standards of care has extremely 
negative implications for health care, and is a cause of unsustainable 
spending. Cost-containment efforts have failed and will continue to 
fail so long as this gap persists. Providers nearly always serve as the 
“deep pocket” for patients, even when it is the insurer who wrongly 
denied coverage.10 Consequently, physicians fear malpractice liability 
whenever an insurer exercises a cost-containment policy, and may 
refuse either to treat a patient or to alter a patient’s records to 
guarantee coverage. Only by eliminating the inconsistencies that the 
liability gap presents can health care costs be controlled in any 
meaningful way. 
Managed care plays a critical role in health care cost-
containment goals, and one that will grow as health care reform looks 
toward insurers to increasingly reduce spending. In the next year, 
managed care will undergo an unprecedented expansion: the 
uninsured 15 percent of the nation will carry coverage for the first 
time in history.11 This tremendous opportunity for enrollment growth 
stems from a legislative assumption that managed care organizations 
are the appropriate vehicles for curbing costs,12 as well as an 
increasing reliance on these entities to fulfill this role as access to care 
expands.13 For better or for worse, managed care is and will continue 
to be the conduit for containing costs. 
 
timely, accurate decisions”); Shauhin A. Talesh, Breaking the Learned Helplessness of Patients: 
Why MCOs Should Be Required to Disclose Financial Incentives, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 49, 
75 (2002) (observing that Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), represents a judicial shift 
from adopting a patient perspective to an MCO perspective). 
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 25. 
 12. None of the legislation set forth in the health care debate has proposed a novel method 
for containing costs. See generally HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH 
REFORM: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF MAJOR HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS 19 
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_sbs_full.pdf (comparing 
the various congressional health reform measures on a continually updated basis). 
 13. Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, refused to grant 
advocates of a single-payer system a seat at health care reform meetings and ordered thirteen 
physicians and nurses to be removed when they arrived regardless. Victoria Colliver, Local 
Supporters of Single-Payer System Head to Capitol Hill, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 2009, at A8. 
House Representative Anthony Weiner proposed a single payer amendment, H..R. 676, to the 
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Yet despite its central role in accomplishing health care reform, 
managed care liability is strikingly absent from legislative discourse. 
In the entire health care debate, only one proposal has even 
mentioned managed care liability—and only tangentially so.14 
Without addressing the present liability landscape governing 
managed care organizations, the current reform movement will rely 
heavily on managed care’s cost-containment strategies without 
implementing an effective safeguard against overaggressive and 
medically inappropriate tactics. 
The success of health care reform is far beyond the scope of this 
Note, which addresses only the movement’s extensive reliance on 
managed care as the vehicle for curbing rising costs. Absent express 
legislative attention to the disconnect between the liability standards 
attaching to coverage and treatment decisions, this unprecedented 
dependence on the industry will create rippling negative effects on 
the quality of health care.15 
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the role that 
managed care organizations play in making coverage decisions, and 
the extent to which these decisions overlap with treatment decisions 
traditionally left to the physician. Part I also briefly examines the 
legislative proposals for health care reform, and—finding that none of 
these proposals advocate changing the way third-party payers 
participate in the system—concludes that managed care’s role in 
health care will not change. Part II sets forth the current liability 
scheme governing managed care organizations’ coverage decisions. It 
 
House health care reform bill. Press Release, Physicians for a Nat’l Health Program, House 
Vote on Single Payer Will Be Historic First, Doctor’s Group Says (Aug. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2009/august/house_vote_on_single.php. Representative Weiner 
withdrew this amendment before the bill went to a vote, stating that it would distract from 
attempts to create a public option. Press Release, Rep. Weiner Withdraws Single Payer 
Amendment from Current Health Care Debate (Nov. 6, 2009), available at 
http://weiner.house.gov/news_display.aspx?id=1368. 
 14. The House Tri-Committee America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 
3200) proposes that Congress adopt standards for financial and administrative transactions to 
which managed care organizations would be held, including standard electronic transactions and 
timely and transparent claims and denial management processes. America’s Affordable Health 
Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 164(a)(1) (as reported by H. Tri-Comm., Oct. 14, 
2009) (“The Secretary shall adopt and regularly update standards . . . . [that will] require timely 
and transparent claim and denial management processes, including tracking, adjudication, and 
appeal processing.”); see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19 
(comparing the various congressional health reform measures on a continually updated basis). 
 15. The different standards of care that attach to a physician’s choice of treatment versus 
an insurer’s decision to cover that treatment create a cascade of problems in health care 
delivery. See infra Parts II.B, III.A–B. 
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illustrates that, because of ERISA’s preemptive effect,16 the majority 
of these entities escape any meaningful liability for failure to exercise 
due care in denying treatment coverage. Part III then contrasts this 
liability with the traditional tort regime governing physician behavior, 
arguing that two regimes governing utilization review and treating 
physicians create incompatible standards for care that is administered 
to the same patient. Finally, Part IV argues that these conflicting 
standards are antithetical to the goal of managed care: providing low-
cost and high-quality health care. 
I.  MANAGED CARE: THE DE FACTO VEHICLE FOR COST 
CONTAINMENT 
Managed care emerged as a method to control costs of the fee-
for-service reimbursement system supported by insurance plans. 
Under a fee-for-service model, an insurer reimburses a health care 
provider for services rendered.17 The physician alone determines the 
“volume and kinds of services” he provides.18 Under a managed care 
model, however, an insurer reviews the care the physician provides—
either prospectively or retrospectively—and reserves the right to 
approve or deny requests for coverage. The physician cannot provide 
and bill for endless services, thereby subjecting the patient to 
unnecessary care for his own financial gain.19 However, in their quest 
to eliminate coverage of superfluous care, insurers may also deny 
payments for medically necessary care, thereby precluding physicians 
from providing appropriate treatments. Therefore, the degree to 
which managed care and physician decisions conflict is important to 
understand. 
Managed care replaced indemnity insurance in an effort to 
reduce the high costs realized under a traditional fee-for-service 
 
 16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 (2006); see also infra Part II. 
 17. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000) (“Traditionally, medical care in the 
United States has been provided on a ‘fee-for-service’ basis. A physician charges so much for a 
general physical exam, a vaccination, a tonsillectomy, and so on. The physician bills the patient 
for services provided or, if there is insurance and the doctor is willing, submits the bill for the 
patient’s care to the insurer . . . .”). 
 18. Arnold S. Relman, Perspective, Doctors as the Key to Health Care Reform, 361 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1225, 1225 (2009). 
 19. Cf. id. (noting that the fee-for-service payment structure creates a “strong financial 
incentive for [physicians] to maximize the elective services they provide”). 
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reimbursement schedule.20 Replacing a payment schedule that 
rewarded quantity over quality,21 managed care ideally controls 
spending by “managing” a patient’s treatment regime and thereby 
ensuring that the patient does not receive duplicative or unnecessary 
diagnostics or procedures.22 This process is called utilization review—
insurers review the care a physician recommends, and determine 
whether it is within the patient’s plan.23 This determination often 
hinges on whether the care is medically necessary. 
Managed care coverage decisions conflict with physician 
decisions whenever an insurer denies coverage for a treatment the 
physician prescribes. The decision made in utilization review—
whether a treatment is medically necessary—has traditionally been a 
decision reserved exclusively for the treating physician.24 Therefore, 
when an insurer denies coverage of a treatment plan, managed care 
effectively trumps the physician’s treatment decisions and directly 
interferes with patient care. 
At face value, obstruction of patient care appears inflammatory, 
but utilization review is not necessarily antithetical to quality care. 
When cost containment is a priority, managed care organizations are 
more effective than physicians at performing the utilization review 
 
 20. Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health Insurance and the Growth in 
Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587, 593 (2002) (“In the 1980s and 1990s 
managed care insurance in its various forms . . . largely replaced traditional indemnity insurance 
for general health insurance.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218 (“In a fee-for-service system, a physician’s financial 
incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is forthcoming. The check on this 
incentive is a physician’s obligation to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in the 
patient’s interest.”). 
 22. See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20, at 594 (noting that managed care organizations 
were able to expand depth of coverage by implementing highly effective “cost control 
strategies”). 
 23. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“Utilization review refers to an external evaluation of the appropriateness of a given course of 
treatment based upon established clinical criteria.” (quoting Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 n.9 (D. Mass. 1997))); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 352 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (“HMOs often contain costs through a strategy known as ‘utilization review.’ 
Unlike traditional insurance policies, HMOs usually decide whether to reimburse patients for 
medical care prospectively—through utilization or ‘pre-certification’ review. The HMO may 
either perform the utilization review itself or assign the task to a third-party contractor.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 24. Barak Richman, On Doctors and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1731, 1735 (2009) (noting that 
the “chore of making medical decisions and carefully allocating healthcare resources for all of 
society” has traditionally been a role of physicians). 
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role.25 This becomes apparent as soon as one considers the divergent 
costs of medicine in different regions of the nation.26 Spending levels 
are correlated neither with quality of care nor with medical 
experience, but rather differ based on the practice routines of a given 
region’s physicians.27 For example, the average annual cost of care 
provided to Medicare patients—which is one of the best 
approximations of total health care spending—ranged from just over 
six thousand dollars to over fifteen thousand dollars in different 
regions, but quality of care did not differ between those regions.28 
Physicians in high-cost regions provide up to 60 percent more care—
more tests, procedures, specialist consultations, and hospital 
admissions—than physicians in low-cost regions, but do not produce 
healthier patients in doing so.29 In fact, President Obama’s budget 
director estimates that the government could reduce Medicare 
spending by nearly 30 percent if spending in high-cost regions was 
reduced to the levels in lower-cost areas.30 The Supreme Court also 
has recognized the need for constraining costs, and views this as a 
function of managed care.31 
In addition to constraining costs, managed care organizations 
could (but currently do not) serve as umbrellas in integrated systems 
of care.32 Integrated systems of care reduce costs and improve quality 
in two ways. First, by fostering collaboration and cooperation 
between health care providers in all specialties and at all levels of 
 
 25. See Ellen Wertheimer, Calling It a Leg Doesn’t Make It a Leg: Doctors, Lawyers, and 
Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 154, 168 (2008) (noting that courts have treated 
cost-containment policies as “a necessary check on doctors’ perceived tendency to recommend 
unnecessary and excessive treatment”). 
 26. Gawande, supra note 1 passim. 
 27. Id. at 40–41. 
 28. Id. at 36. 
 29. Id. at 38. 
 30. Id. at 39 (citing Peter Orszag, Budget Director for President Obama). 
 31. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 234 (2000) (“HMOs came into being because 
some groups of physicians consistently provided more aggressive treatment than others in 
similar circumstances, with results not perceived as justified by the marginal expense and risk 
associated with intervention.”). 
 32. For example, in Massachusetts, a state commission on health care payment issues has 
recommended the state manage its growing health care costs and improve quality of delivery by 
creating “‘accountable care organizations’ (ACOs), which would organize physicians into 
multispecialty teams with strong primary care staffing.” Relman, supra note 18, at 1226; see also 
Robert Steinbrook, Perspective, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for Payment 
Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036, 1036–38 (2009) (describing the 
commission’s proposal for payment reform in more detail). 
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training, integrated systems eliminate piecemeal physician 
decisionmaking, and thereby reduce repetition and error in patient 
care.33 Second, by redistributing liability such that the third-party 
payers bear risk for adverse outcomes, payers assume accountability 
for the administration of all care delivered to its beneficiaries.34 
Delivery systems such as the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente 
have successfully coordinated patient care, but are outliers in a 
system dominated by disaggregated practice groups or individuals.35 
Furthermore, these integrated group practices do not rely on private 
insurers to make coverage decisions, and some argue that they could 
not do so without sacrificing quality of care.36 Others assert that 
managed care can properly organize provider delivery if subject to 
enterprise liability.37  
Building systems of integrated care may be the ultimate goal,38 
but containing costs while expanding coverage is the only priority 
receiving legislative attention at the moment. Instead, health care 
reform legislation is focused both on expanding coverage39 and 
 
 33. See Francis J. Crosson, Perspective, 21st-Century Health Care—The Case for Integrated 
Delivery Systems, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1324, 1325 (2009) (referring to studies “show[ing] that 
integrated care is positively correlated with improved quality”); Relman, supra note 18, at 1226 
(proposing a health care delivery system based on multispecialty group practices). 
 34. Many argue that risk sharing between providers and payers would incentivize providers 
to exercise optimal care and payers to establish quality oversight. See Jennifer Arlen & W. 
Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1993–95 (2003) (arguing that entity level liability on the part of the 
managed care organization results in optimal levels of care by all parties); Crosson, supra note 
33, at 1325 (“Kaiser Permanente’s history shows that risk sharing between the payer and the 
care delivery system can work quite well.”). 
 35. Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324; see also Relman, supra note 18, at 1226 (citing 
integrated systems such as the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente as models for reform). 
 36. See Relman, supra note 18, at 1227 (arguing that private insurers’ role in a system of 
integrated care should be limited to making capitated prepayments to the physician groups, 
“leav[ing] medical care decisions where they belong—in the hands of physicians and patients”). 
 37. Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1993–95; see also Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. 
Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era of “Systems-Think”: The Implications for Managed 
Care Organizational Liability and Patient Safety, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 300 (2001) 
(suggesting that the threat of liability may encourage MCOs to improve quality). 
 38. The Chairman of the Council of Accountable Physician Practices argues that “rapid 
transition for established integrated delivery systems and gradual transition for the majority of 
physicians and hospitals” is necessary to improve quality of care while constraining spending. 
He notes that while this change may be spurred with “early forms of payment reform,” it is 
impossible to predict how long it would take to complete. Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324–25. 
 39. The Obama administration has made clear that increased access to care is a primary 
goal. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 26 (“[M]oving to provide all Americans 
with health insurance is not only a moral imperative, but it is also essential to a more effective 
and efficient health care system.”). 
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reducing unsustainable costs.40 These goals require extremely 
effective cost-containment strategies that physicians alone cannot 
offer.41 Without drastic reductions in health care spending, an 
unprecedented number of Americans will face bankruptcy merely by 
seeking necessary treatment.42 Thus, President Obama has called on 
Congress to reform health care “so that patients get the best care, not 
just the most expensive care.”43 To this end, Congress seems to be 
relying on both reduced federal fee-for-service payments44 and on 
managed care organizations’ ability to contain costs, and has rejected 
proposals that would alter this structure of compensation for care.45 
Furthermore, neither the House nor the Senate has considered 
altering managed care’s role in performing utilization review. For 
example, although numerous proposals focus on “reducing waste and 
inefficiency” and eliminating “unnecessary” or “repetitive” 
treatments and procedures, none sets forth the means to achieve 
these goals.46 Therefore, managed care will increasingly serve to 
control health care spending. 
Discord between managed care and physician treatment 
decisions is problematic when it involves disagreement over the rigor 
or quality of treatment a patient will receive. Whereas a physician’s 
treatment recommendation must meet a reasonable standard of care, 
a managed care organization’s refusal to cover that treatment need 
 
 40. The administration has promised to “reduce high administrative costs, unnecessary 
tests and services, waste, and other inefficiencies that consume money with no added benefit.” 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19. 
 41. See Crosson, supra note 33, at 1324 (arguing that health care reform in Massachusetts is 
evidence that “near-universal coverage can be attained” but will only be “financially 
sustainable” if the unnecessary care resulting from fee-for-service payment of physicians is 
eliminated). 
 42. Between 2001 and 2007, the proportion of bankruptcies due to medical debt increased 
by 50 percent. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: 
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 744 (2009). 
 43. Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on Health Care and the Senate 
Vote on F-22 Funding (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-by-the-President-on-Health-Care-and-the-Senate-Vote-on-F-22-Funding/. 
 44. Reducing Medicare reimbursement rates is one way legislators propose to reduce 
federal costs. Denis A. Cortese & Jeffrey O. Korsmo, Perspective, Putting U.S. Health Care on 
the Right Track, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1326, 1327 (2009). 
 45. The most obvious alternative to managed care—a single-payer system—was quickly 
eliminated from consideration in the health care debate. See supra note 13. 
 46. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19–23 (summarizing 
proposals for cost containment). 
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not.47 Because managed care organizations aspire to decrease 
expenditures, they deny coverage whenever possible48 and escape 
liability even when a denial is negligent.49 Moreover, because few 
patients can afford treatments their insurers refuse to cover, a 
managed care organization nearly always trumps a physician in 
defining medically necessary care. Thus, physicians occasionally are 
prohibited from providing care that is consistent with their 
professional and legal obligations. Part II describes the standard of 
care that managed care organizations must meet, and the liability 
vacuum many of them enjoy. Part III then illustrates the discrepancy 
between the standard of care governing the treatment decisions made 
in utilization review, and those made by the practicing physician. 
II.  THE EXISTING LIABILITY REGIME GOVERNING MANAGED 
CARE’S ADMINISTRATION OF UTILIZATION REVIEW POLICIES 
Most managed care organizations operate in a legal vacuum. The 
preemptive force of ERISA shields an employer-sponsored health 
plan from state and common law theories of liability, including 
medical malpractice, even when it makes medical treatment decisions 
through utilization review. ERISA allows plan beneficiaries to 
challenge coverage decisions for breach of contract, but not for 
negligence.50 Essentially, these plans make determinations about the 
medical necessity of a given treatment, but are not held to the 
professional standards of care a patient expects of his doctor.51 They 
can be liable for nothing more than the cost of benefits denied, even 
when a coverage decision resulted in irreversible injury or death.52 
 
 47. Under ERISA, any employer-sponsored health plan is exempted from state law 
standards of care relating to the administration of benefits. See infra Part II. 
 48. Cf. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 250 (“Inevitably . . . managed care practices or 
incentives will cause or contribute to harm in some individual cases.”); Charity Scott, Why Law 
Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 245, 289 n.136 (2000) (“[I]n their zeal to control utilization, managed care plans may 
withhold appropriate diagnostic procedures or treatment modalities for patients.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed 
Care, 273 JAMA 330, 330–35 (1995))). 
 49. See infra Part II. 
 50. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 51. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., 
concurring), quoted by Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 52. Id. 
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This Part illustrates why most managed care organizations face 
little liability for their medical treatment decisions. Section A 
discusses the broad preemptive effects of ERISA. Section B then 
demonstrates preemption’s practical effects on potential plaintiffs by 
highlighting the state law remedies that it forecloses. 
A.   ERISA’s “[E]xtraordinary [P]re-emptive [P]ower” 53 
Federal law usually preempts state and common law theories of 
liability applied to managed care organizations. The majority of 
individuals receive health insurance through their employers,54 which 
places most managed care under the purview of ERISA. ERISA 
governs all pension plans offered by employers (with exception for 
some government employers and church plans).55 Enacted to protect 
employee interests in pension and benefit plans from both plan 
default and plan mismanagement,56 ERISA provides employee 
plaintiffs with a federal cause of action and several federal remedies.57 
At the same time, it preempts nearly all related state causes of 
action.58 ERISA preemption is extremely broad; only one other 
 
 53. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 
(1987)). 
 54. Nearly two-thirds of the population under sixty-five (the age at which Medicare 
benefits accrue) receive employer-sponsored health insurance. Mark W. Stanton, Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance: Trends in Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION, Sept. 2004, 
at 1, 1, http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/empspria.pdf; see also TOM DASCHLE, SCOTT S. 
GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW, CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE 
HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 188 (2008) (noting that employers provide health care insurance for 60 
percent of Americans, though this number is falling quickly as health care premiums rise). 
 55. BARRY D. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 267 (4th ed. 2008). 
 56. E.g., McKenzie, supra note 8, at 275. 
 57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–35 (2006); see also McKenzie, supra note 8, at 279 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has . . . construed [ERISA] section 502(a) to have extremely broad preemptive 
power. . . . [T]he Court has held that state contract, tort and statutory claims that could have 
been brought . . . are preempted . . . . A second and distinct type of preemption emanating from 
502(a) is termed ‘complete preemption.’ . . . Complete preemption serves to re-characterize a 
state law claim into one arising under federal law. As such, the claim is removable by a 
defendant to federal court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 58. Designed to provide uniformity in the administration of employee benefit plans, 
ERISA’s conflict and complete preemption clauses preempt any cause of action arising under a 
state law relating to an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (interpreting Congress’s rejection of a limited preemption 
clause as evidence of intent to create sweeping preemption of state laws); Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983) (“By establishing benefit plan regulation ‘as exclusively a 
federal concern,’ Congress minimized the need for interstate employers to administer their 
plans differently in each State in which they have employees.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981))); McKenzie, supra note 8, at 278–
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federal law, the Labor Management Relations Act, has similar 
preemptive power.59 
ERISA preemption is problematic in the context of managed 
care. Congress enacted ERISA before employee benefit plans 
encompassed health insurance, and before managed care dominated 
health care administration.60 Thus, it fashioned civil remedies to allow 
beneficiaries to recover from the wrongful administration of ordinary 
pension, but not health care, benefits. In other words, ERISA allows 
beneficiaries to recover the cost of benefits denied but precludes 
recovery of compensatory or punitive damages. When a beneficiary is 
denied coverage of medically necessary care, however, he suffers not 
only economic loss, but also adverse health consequences (including 
death). Thus, recovery of the benefits denied is severely inadequate in 
the context of wrongful administration of health care benefits. 
Moreover, because ERISA remedies are exclusive, a wronged 
beneficiary may not turn to state law to recover for the harm that 
ERISA ignores. 
 
79, 282–83 (providing an in-depth discussion of ERISA’s preemption and savings clauses). 
ERISA, however, does not preempt claims that are exempted from preemption by a savings 
clause. See Charlotte Johnson, Comment, Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable 
Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ Impenetrable ERISA Shield, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1590 (“ERISA 
itself contains a safe harbor called the Savings Clause, which allows state law claims to avoid 
ERISA preemption if the claims relate to the ‘business of insurance.’ However, the Supreme 
Court has narrowly interpreted the Savings Clause to only allow exemption from preemption if 
the state law claimed does not . . . conflict with what is covered by ERISA’s remedial scheme as 
contained in § 502.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 114(b)(2)(A))); see also McKenzie, 
supra note 8, at 278–79, 282–83 (providing an in-depth discussion of ERISA’s preemption and 
savings clauses). 
 59. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)) (“[ERISA’s] pre-emptive 
force mirror[s] the pre-emptive force of LMRA . . . . [T]he ERISA civil enforcement mechanism 
is one of those provisions with such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an 
ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-
pleaded complaint rule.’” (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987))). 
 60. Johnson, supra note 58, at 1590. Courts disagree as to whether Congress foresaw that 
ERISA would preempt causes of action arising from the negligent implementation of cost-
containment policies. Compare Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas), 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996) (reasoning that Congress did not intend to preempt recovery for negligent 
implementation of cost-containment policies because these policies were nonexistent at the 
time), with Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 894 n.6 (Pa. 1998) (pointing to the 
enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 as evidence that Congress 
understood the extent and implications of cost-containment activities when it drafted ERISA). 
Whether Congress foresaw cost containment as an element of health care administration is a 
rather academic point; regardless of congressional intent, ERISA preemption has resulted in a 
completely inconsistent recovery system for the negligent administration of cost-containment 
policies, and thus creates an inadequate legal landscape for the governing of managed care 
activity. 
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The Supreme Court is not blind to ERISA’s shortcomings in the 
context of health care administration. It has tried to account for the 
unique nature of the administration of health care benefits in its 
preemption reasoning. Specifically, the Court has distinguished 
between coverage decisions hinging on eligibility and those hinging 
on treatment,61 reasoning that only the former fall under ERISA.62 In 
other words, the Court has acknowledged that when plans make 
treatment decisions, they affect patient care rather than the 
administration of benefits, and thus implicate state medical 
malpractice law. The Court’s reading of ERISA preemption, 
however, is so broad that it has refused to allow wronged 
beneficiaries to use state law to challenge a coverage decision that 
involved both medical judgment and plan administration, so long as 
the medical judgment was made by a utilization review physician who 
never saw the patient.63 As a result, patients denied coverage of 
medically necessary care suffer real health consequences but are 
precluded from recovering anything more than the cost of benefits 
denied. 
Pure eligibility decisions emulate traditional plan administration 
tasks, hinging on “[r]ules governing collection of premiums, definition 
of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements 
over entitlement to services.”64 In other words, an eligibility decision 
 
 61. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000). 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 229–31 (refusing to allow a claim filed under ERISA to allege breach of 
fiduciary duty where the contested action involved an element of a treatment decision, rather 
than a pure eligibility decision). 
 63. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the plaintiffs’ state tort claims against the defendant insurance company for negligent 
supervision and training of personnel and negligent infliction of emotional distress were 
preempted by ERISA because they “create[d] a threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and 
local regulation of the administration of ERISA plans”); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 
937, 941–42 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs’ state law claims against the defendant 
insurance company for wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical 
malpractice, and insurance bad faith were preempted by ERISA because they related to the 
insurance plan); Corcoran v. United HealthCare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that, because the defendant insurance company had made “medical decisions incident 
to benefit determinations,” the plaintiffs’ state tort action for wrongful death of their child was 
preempted by ERISA (emphasis added)); Elsesser v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. 
Supp. 1286, 1290–91 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs’ state tort negligence claims, 
founded on the defendant insurance company’s refusal “to pay for the [requested medical 
device],” were preempted by ERISA when the plaintiffs sought to hold the company “directly 
liable” for negligence, explaining that “such a claim . . . clearly has a [connection to] a benefit 
plan” (second alteration in original)). 
 64. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223. 
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involves nothing more than a determination as to whether a given 
treatment is covered under the terms of a beneficiary’s plan.65 These 
decisions are squarely governed by ERISA.66 Thus, ERISA would 
preempt a beneficiary from using state law to challenge denied 
coverage of a given drug treatment based on the terms of a plan 
because the claim would contest what was “promised under the terms 
of [an] ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan[].”67 
Treatment decisions, on the other hand, involve medical 
judgments. Because managed care organizations perform utilization 
review, some benefits decisions go far beyond the scope of traditional 
plan administration. For example, a blanket provision in a policy that 
required all newborns to be discharged within twenty-four hours of 
birth was not governed by ERISA (and could be challenged under 
state law) because it directly implicated medical care.68 When 
eligibility for coverage hinges on a treatment being medically 
necessary, a plan administrator must make a “mixed” coverage 
decision—interpreting both the terms of a beneficiary’s plan and the 
medical needs of the patient.69 To the extent that a health plan covers 
medically necessary treatment, a coverage denial will hinge on an 
insurer’s determination that physician-recommended care is not 
implicated, and will result in the insurer overriding the treating 
physician’s course of treatment—substituting a lower-cost option or 
denying coverage completely. Inappropriate coverage denial can have 
the same practical effect as a physician’s failure to exercise reasonable 
care, and can cause far greater harm than ordinary misappropriation 
of plan benefits.70 Thus, in Pegram v. Herdrich,71 the Supreme Court 
 
 65. Id. at 228. 
 66. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (reasoning that a state or 
common law cause of action “based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits 
under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet[s] the criteria for pre-emption” (emphasis 
added)). 
 67. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 211 (2004). 
 68. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162–64 (3d Cir. 1999). But see Corcoran, 965 
F.2d at 1322–24, 1333 n.16 (concluding that ERISA preempted a medical malpractice claim 
against an insurer for refusal to cover hospitalization for fetal monitoring—resulting in 
stillbirth—because the decision was related to a “cost-containment feature of the plan” and thus 
“implicated the management of plan assets”). 
 69. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228 (reasoning that pure “eligibility decisions” turn on a plan’s 
coverage of particular conditions or medical procedures, whereas “‘[t]reatment decisions,’ by 
contrast, are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition: given 
a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response”). 
 70. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
how the defendant insurance company refused to cover the plaintiff’s heart surgery until it was 
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concluded that ERISA does not govern treatment decisions that 
ultimately affect quality of care (rather than mere quantity of 
benefits).72 In Pegram, a patient suffered a ruptured appendix after 
her physician ordered her to wait eight days for an ultrasound at a 
clinic affiliated with the insurer, rather than get immediate care at a 
local hospital. The treating physician happened to own the HMO 
governing the patient’s benefits.73 The Court concluded that ERISA 
could not bar the beneficiary from bringing state law malpractice and 
fraud actions against the insurer-physician because the provision of 
medical care is not within ERISA’s scope.74 
Since concluding that treatment decisions are beyond ERISA’s 
scope,75 however, the Court has construed the class of coverage 
determinations that implicate these decisions extremely narrowly.76 In 
other words, the universe of mixed decisions that survive preemption 
is quite small77—ERISA governs any utilization review decision unless 
the patient’s treating physician is directly involved.78 Courts reason 
that a claim dispute implicating a treating physician is beyond the 
 
too late for him to undergo surgery); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Kuhl, 999 F.2d 298 
(No. 93-755) (“Without threat of legal recourse, an HMO’s most cost-effective decisionmaking 
process includes the provision of only suboptimal medical care to the patient/member . . . . It no 
longer makes economic sense for the HMO to base its medical decisionmaking on the best 
interests of patient/members. [The plaintiff] was a victim of that kind 
of . . . decisionmaking . . . and he died as a result.”). 
 71. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 72. Id. at 232 (“[W]hen Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under 
ERISA, it concentrated on fiduciaries’ financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the 
difficulty many retirees faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial 
mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their benefits. . . . Its focus was far 
from the subject of [a medical necessity determination] claim.” (citation omitted)). 
 73. Id. at 215. 
 74. See id. at 214 (holding that treatment decisions made by HMOs’ physician employees 
are not fiduciary acts under ERISA). 
 75. Id. at 228. 
 76. Health law scholar Professor Korobkin asserts that the Court’s later narrowing of the 
category of medical decisions that subject insurers to state law was not based on ERISA 
language, and reflects a misreading of the law. See Korobkin, supra note 9, at 534–37 & n.372 
(arguing that a proper interpretation of what falls within the scope of ERISA, and what does 
not, would reduce the perceived need for federal legislation either amending ERISA or creating 
a new federal cause of action against managed care entities). 
 77. Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), significantly narrowed the class of mixed 
decisions that survive preemption). 
 78. See Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 381 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (holding that a claim challenging denial of coverage that entails a mixed eligibility and 
coverage decision is not preempted when that decision was made by either the treating 
physician or his employer). 
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scope of ERISA because it “does not involve a claim for benefits, a 
claim to enforce rights under the benefit plan or a claim challenging 
administration of the benefit plan,” and therefore does not relate to 
the plan.79 In contrast, when a physician conducts utilization review on 
behalf of an insurer without seeing the patient, and disagrees with the 
treating physician’s recommendations, the reviewing physician’s 
decision has a “connection with or a reference to a benefit plan,” and 
is thus protected by complete preemption of any state law tort 
action.80 Essentially, plans may be vicariously liable under state law 
for the actions of treating physicians they employ, but not for the 
actions of utilization review physicians who never see a patient.81 
This narrow interpretation of the extent to which coverage 
determinations involve treatment decisions prevents patients from 
filing malpractice actions against insurers for negligent utilization 
review. For example, the Second Circuit concluded that an insurer’s 
fatal delay in approving coverage of a single stem cell transplant as 
medically necessary (in place of the double stem cell treatment that 
the insurer already had deemed experimental) could not be 
challenged under state law because the insurer was not “actually 
 
 79. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154–55 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); see also id. (“Just as 
ERISA does not preempt the malpractice claim against the doctor, it should not preempt the 
vicarious liability claim against the HMO if the HMO has held out the doctor as its agent.”); 
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding the insurer subject to a 
state malpractice action under a vicarious liability theory because the claim was unrelated to the 
collection of benefits or the terms of the plan); Kohn v. Del. Valley HMO, Inc., No. 91-2745, 
1991 WL 275609, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1991) (“Although an HMO is not usually liable for 
the negligence of the independent contractor physicians and health care providers that service 
the HMO members, an HMO may nevertheless be held liable if the health care provider is the 
‘ostensible’ agent of the HMO. . . . [which requires that the plaintiff establish that] the HMO 
‘act[ed] or omit[ed] (sic) to act in some way which leads the patient to a reasonable belief that 
he is being treated by the [HMO] or one of its employees.’” (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Jones v. Philpott, 702 F. Supp. 1210, 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Boyd v. Albert 
Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988))). 
 80. Elsesser v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290–91 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(quoting Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also id. 
(allowing a state law malpractice action against an HMO for its employment of a primary care 
physician who failed to read the results of a heart monitor after the HMO denied coverage of 
the monitor and ordered the physician to discontinue the patient’s use, but not for the insurer’s 
decision to deny coverage of the monitor). 
 81. See Kohn, 1991 WL 275609, at *2–5 (holding that a malpractice action against an HMO 
for vicarious liability for its treating physicians was not preempted, but that the claims against 
the HMO for direct negligence were preempted). 
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providing medical care” to the patient.82 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that ERISA preempted a malpractice action against an 
insurer that wrongfully denied coverage of a recommended heart 
surgery (only to grant coverage once the patient’s heart had 
deteriorated to a fatal degree) because the utilization review of the 
cardiologist’s recommendations could not be separated from the 
administration of the beneficiary’s benefits.83 
This rule—that preemption arguments fail when the treating 
physician contributes to the decision to deny coverage, but not when 
a utilization review physician denies coverage based on medical 
criteria—has proved impracticable in the lower courts. Courts 
struggle to accept that a medical decision made by a utilization review 
physician is not subject to tort simply because “the only relationship” 
between this physician and the patient is the administration of the 
beneficiary’s plan.84 This confusion has resulted in an unpredictable 
pattern of preemption.85 Liability under state law may turn on “the 
structure of the managed care organization . . . . which state the plan 
is in . . . . [and] the prevailing judicial attitudes toward ERISA 
preemption,”86 among other things.87 Plaintiff lawyers are therefore 
 
 82. Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also 
Land, 381 F.3d at 1276 (reasoning that mixed decisions involving treatment and eligibility 
determinations are preempted so long as the named defendants are neither the actual treating 
physicians nor the physicians’ employers). 
 83. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 84. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200, 211 (2004) (holding that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by ERISA, in part because “the only relationship [the 
defendant insurance company] had with [the plaintiff] was its partial administration of [the 
plaintiff’s] employer’s benefit plan”). 
 85. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 237–39 (discussing how “[various political 
and judicial events have] produced a complicated, evolving, and somewhat dichotomized 
liability landscape” (footnote omitted)); Peter J. Hammer, supra note 8, at 768 n.2 
(“[A]ccountability for health care providers must be cobbled together in an ad hoc fashion. 
Within this patchwork system, it is nearly impossible to answer legal questions concerning 
managed care liability with any level of generality, other than ‘it depends.’”). 
 86. Hammer, supra note 8, at 768 n.2 (noting that judicial attitudes toward preemption 
“have themselves changed dramatically over just the past five years”). 
 87. The perceptions of attorneys working for managed care organizations reflect this 
uncertainty. In a series of interviews with health plan managers and attorneys representing the 
plans, Professors Agrawal and Hall found wide variability in the perceived risk of liability. See 
Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 238–39 (noting that many attorneys working for local managed 
care organizations—in states with and without right-to-sue statutes—described the risk of 
liability as only a “theoretical concern,” whereas attorneys working for national or interstate 
managed care organizations described the risk of liability as substantial and predicted that the 
real impact of liability will be felt within a few years). 
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hesitant even to name a managed care organization as a defendant.88 
Thus, ERISA has sufficiently confused the legal backdrop behind 
managed care, creating a blanket of protection for insurers 
administering employee benefit plans.89 
B.   A Day Late and a Dollar Short 
ERISA preemption precludes beneficiaries from recovering 
compensatory or punitive damages for denial of treatment coverage 
decisions that negatively affect care.90 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of ERISA preemption has resulted in 
inconsistent theories of liability that discourage wronged beneficiaries 
from filing claims against their insurers. 
ERISA generally preempts state right-to-sue laws and denies 
injured plaintiffs recovery of anything more than the cost of benefits 
denied.91 State laws creating liability for the negligent denial of 
 
 88. See Mark A. Hall & Gail Agrawal, MarketWatch: The Impact of State Managed Care 
Liability Statutes, 22 HEALTH AFF. 138, 143 (2003) (“[A]lmost all of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we 
interviewed said that they are very reluctant to sue health plans unless the right set of facts 
presents itself.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 250 (“[M]anaged care organizations have 
enjoyed a shield from liability for challenges to cost containment initiatives, at least as to claims 
by those 137 million Americans who are ERISA plan beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted)); Scott, 
supra note 48, at 290 n.138 (“ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health 
insurers, utilization review providers, and other managed care entities from potential liability 
for the consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.” (quoting Andrews-Clarke v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 1997))). 
 90. There is a strong argument that the Court has mistakenly focused on preemption, 
ERISA’s secondary purpose, at the expense of benefit protection, its primary purpose. See 
McKenzie, supra note 8, at 276 (“The Court’s emphasis on ERISA’s secondary purpose 
[preemption] has come at the expense of the Act’s stated primary purpose. Although drafted 
primarily to protect the interests of employees in their pension and benefit plans, ERISA often 
erects insurmountable barriers to employees’ claims against these plans. The result is that a 
beneficiary sustaining damages as a result of this health plan’s denial of a covered benefit often 
has no adequate remedy under state or federal law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Johnson, 
supra note 58, at 1589–90 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has inadvertently painted itself into a 
corner by restrictively interpreting ERISA to preclude compensatory relief to victims of HMO 
patient treatment decisions[] . . . .”). 
 91. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that recovery under ERISA is limited to the cost of medical benefits denied); 
Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 195 (Wis. 2008) (holding that “the 
appropriate remedy is for the beneficiary to be provided with a benefits application process that 
is not arbitrary and capricious, which may or may not result in coverage for the treatments”). 
The Court has consistently rejected arguments that ERISA’s grant of “equitable relief” under 
section 1132 allows for a remedy that would make the plaintiff whole—a remedy that, following 
the denial of health care coverage, would require recovery of much more than the monetary 
value of benefits denied. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
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coverage for medically necessary care92 expressly allow plaintiffs to 
sue managed care organizations,93 but very rarely survive preemption 
challenges.94 As a result, wronged beneficiaries seeking recovery from 
an employer-based insurer are left with the sparse civil remedies 
offered by ERISA.95 The following three cases are illustrative of this 
problem, and set the scene for understanding why patients often sue 
their physicians for the harm their insurers have created. 
First, in the most famous wrongful denial of coverage dispute, 
the Supreme Court considered two consolidated challenges to two 
different health plans.96 Uncontested in both challenges was that the 
plan beneficiaries had suffered irreversible harm as a result of 
wrongful denials of care coverage. One suffered internal bleeding 
after his plan substituted a lower cost pain killer for his physician-
prescribed medication.97 He was subsequently hospitalized and 
 
204, 209–10 (2002) (noting that equitable relief does not constitute all relief); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Ass., 508 U.S. 248, 258 (1993) (“‘Equitable’ relief must mean something less than all relief.”); 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (“Congress did not provide, and did 
not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action for extracontractual damages caused by 
improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.”); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA 
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003) (arguing both that the Court has erred in applying an 
antiquated meaning of “equitable relief” to ERISA litigation, and that this error may be 
corrected in time, as suggested by the strong dissents in all three cases). 
 92. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 271–74 (describing state laws creating 
managed care liability whenever possible without running into ERISA preemption). 
 93. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 48, at 290 n.138 (discussing various theories of liability under 
which challenges to denials of medically necessary care have been successful); see also Agrawal 
& Hall, supra note 8, at 240 n.16 (noting the large awards against managed care organizations 
for denial of coverage); James Bartimus & Christopher A. Wright, HMO Liability: From 
Corporate Negligence Claims for Negligent Credentialing and Utilization Review to Bad Faith, 66 
UMKC L. REV. 763, 772 (1998) (noting the first successful bad faith tort claim for denial of 
coverage of care). 
 94. Cf. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 253–54 (discussing lower court cases that seem to 
chip away at ERISA preemption of state laws that create managed care liability, but noting that 
a few Supreme Court opinions only hint at doing so in dicta); McKenzie, supra note 8, at 272 
(discussing a punitive damages award against an employer-sponsored health care plan, which 
seems to contradict ERISA preemption precedent); Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 291 
(suggesting that ERISA preemption is weakening). 
 95. Justice Ginsburg has described ERISA as creating a “regulatory vacuum” in which 
“virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.” 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)). 
 96. Id. at 204 (majority opinion). 
 97. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Aetna Health, 
542 U.S. 200. 
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underwent substantial treatment.98 The other experienced post-
surgical complications and was rehospitalized after her insurer denied 
coverage of the extended hospital stay recommended by her 
physician.99 The issue was whether the wronged beneficiaries could 
recover pain and suffering damages under a state law that required 
health plans to exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment 
decisions.100 The Court concluded that the state law cause of action 
could not survive ERISA’s “extraordinary pre-emptive power,” even 
though it did not facially implicate the federal law.101 In other words, 
because the “only connection” between the beneficiaries and their 
respective health plans was the administration of the plan, the 
plaintiffs were doing nothing more than contesting that 
administration, even though it involved medical decisionmaking.102 
Therefore, the plaintiffs were unable to recover under state tort law 
and were limited to filing a federal action for breach of contract, 
seeking nothing more than “recovery of benefits denied.”103 
The Fifth Circuit also concluded that ERISA preempted a 
beneficiary’s claim for wrongful denial of coverage, which had been 
filed under state insurance regulations.104 The plaintiff, a cancer 
patient, sued the third-party administrator of her insurer’s utilization 
review policy, alleging that it had issued secret coverage guidelines 
instructing its employees to differentiate between medically necessary 
and experimental treatments in a different manner than that set forth 
in the plan’s policy.105 Reasoning that ERISA does not provide a 
remedy for generating and adhering to secret coverage guidelines—
even those that materially affect decisions to deny coverage—the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant insurer, leaving the plaintiff with nothing.106 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 205. 
 100. Id. at 204; Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 88.001–.003 (West 2004 Supp. Pamphlet). 
 101. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 207–09 (“[W]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts 
the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even 
if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. ERISA is one of these 
statutes.” (citations omitted)). 
 102. Id. at 214. 
 103. Id. at 211. 
 104. Hubbard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 42 F.3d 942, 945 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 105. Id. at 944–45. 
 106. Id. at 946. 
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Finally, a court in the Northern District of Texas came to the 
same conclusion when presented with a preemption challenge to 
common law malpractice and negligence claims filed against an 
insurer.107 The deceased beneficiary—a non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma 
patient—experienced a fatal delay in beginning chemotherapy after a 
Kaiser physician misdiagnosed her with Hepatitis C.108 Her estate 
sued Kaiser, alleging that cost-containment policies had limited the 
physician’s use of diagnostic procedures and had tortiously interfered 
with the patient-physician relationship.109 The court, concluding that 
“claims regarding plan guidelines and utilization review procedures” 
are always preempted, denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand to 
state court.110 
These cases provide a glimpse of the extent to which ERISA’s 
preemptive force denies beneficiaries recourse against insurers. The 
result is that beneficiaries—wrongly denied coverage of medically 
necessary care—suffer the ensuing harm of forgoing treatment, and 
are left with no recourse other than the recovery of benefits originally 
denied. Several courts have recognized this inherent gap in the law111 
and have called out to Congress to address the issue.112 Others insist 
that the recovery of benefits is equitable and fair,113 turning a blind 
 
 107. Silva v. Kaiser Permanente, 59 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
 108. Id. at 598. 
 109. Id. at 599. 
 110. Id. at 599–600. 
 111. See Yodzis v. Tilak, 2009 WL 465448, at *13–14 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2009) (noting that 
preemption of a malpractice claim against an insurer for wrongful denial of coverage unfairly 
leaves the plaintiff without recovery, but that the court is helpless to rule otherwise until 
Congress amends the law). 
 112. Justice Ginsburg, feeling compelled by ERISA’s plain language to concur in the 
Court’s Aetna Health decision, announced that she did so only while joining “the rising judicial 
chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled 
ERISA regime.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); see also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in 
part) (describing ERISA’s remedial scheme as a “gaping wound” that “will not be healed until 
the Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or 
Congress revisits the law to the same end”). 
 113. See, e.g., Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 211 (“Upon the denial of benefits, respondents 
could have paid for the treatment themselves and then sought reimbursement through a 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) action, or sought a preliminary injunction.”); Cicio v. John Does, 385 F.3d 156, 
157 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (noting that the decedent “could have paid for the 
treatment . . . . and then sought reimbursement . . . . or sought a preliminary injunction” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 273–74 
(3d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that patients who are wrongfully denied care should seek an 
injunction enforcing the administration of employee benefits under ERISA’s section 502(a)). 
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eye to the immeasurable harm that the denial of coverage can cause 
patients who cannot otherwise afford necessary treatment.114 
III.  THE GAP BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT LIABILITY: 
APPLYING DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF CARE TO UTILIZATION 
REVIEW AND DIRECT PATIENT CARE 
 Extensive federal preemption shields most managed care plans 
from state and common law liability even when they make coverage 
decisions regarding the medical necessity of care. Thus, the liability 
attaching to negligent treatment decisions made during utilization 
review is substantially less than the liability that attaches to treatment 
decisions made by the practicing physician. Ironically, the former’s 
treatment decisions trump and sometimes even shape those of the 
latter. This discrepancy in liability and authority results in two 
paradoxical consequences. First, insurers exert tremendous control 
over physician decisionmaking and can prospectively deny coverage 
for a physician’s recommended course of treatment. Second, despite 
subjection to this power, treating physicians retain ultimate 
responsibility for the patient’s treatment as well as any adverse 
outcomes. Moreover, because patients often cannot file state law 
claims against managed care organizations, this physician is 
frequently the only available defendant. 
A.  Managed and Well Controlled 
The essence of managed care organizations is control over 
physician decisionmaking. Indeed, this control is imperative to the 
ultimate success of any cost-containment policy seeking to curtail 
unnecessary care. The Congressional Budget Office attributes the 
 
 114. The harm caused by the denial of treatment is often fatal. See, e.g., Payton v. Aetna/US 
Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (noting 
that the patient, who had repeatedly appealed the denial of coverage for inpatient chemical 
dependency rehabilitation, died of a drug overdose eight days before his insurer accepted the 
State Insurance Department’s finding that the patient’s contract “‘plainly’ covers inpatient 
substance abuse rehabilitation” and reversed its denial of coverage); Mariner, supra note 9, at 
265 (“[I]t is unlikely that [seeking an injunction to enforce administration of benefits] could 
speed up or improve the decisionmaking process in the majority of cases . . . . It is unrealistic to 
expect patients who are sick and in need of rapid treatment to go to federal court to make sure 
that their health plans make timely, accurate decisions.”); see also Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. 
Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 856–57 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding ample evidence that the insurer acted 
unreasonably in denying benefits); Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 894 n.6 (Pa. 1998) 
(arguing that Congress was not ignorant of cost-containment procedures utilized by HMOs 
when it crafted ERISA). 
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success of insurers’ cost-containment efforts to four factors, all of 
which require a level of control: (1) contracting with cost-conscious 
providers; (2) establishing an effective network of information about 
and control over these providers; (3) placing financial risk on 
providers; and (4) generating a large portion of each provider’s 
patient load.115 
Managed care organizations exert this control in various ways, 
many of which stem from their contractual agreements with 
providers.116 By limiting coverage to a given set of physicians, 
managed care organizations ensure that doctors cannot treat their 
enrollees without being bound to their policies.117 Thus, managed care 
organizations effectively force physicians to comply with cost-
containment practices.118 Capitation payments, salaries and bonuses, 
fee withholding, without-cause termination, and utilization review are 
all examples of either direct or indirect control over physicians.119 
Short of exclusion from a policy, these forms of control, coupled with 
physicians’ liability risks,120 negatively affect morale, relationships 
with patients, and the ability to provide quality health care.121 
 
 115. Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans 
Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1682–83 (1995). 
 116. Legislation passed in the 1980s provided managed care organizations with the right to 
selectively contract with physicians. Harold S. Luft, Why Are Physicians So Upset About 
Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 957, 958–59 (1999). 
 117. Restriction over patients’ choice of physicians varies by type of managed care 
organization; Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) restrict patients to visiting providers 
contracting with the HMO, whereas Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point of 
Service HMO plans offer higher benefits or lower co-pays to patients who see providers 
contracting with these plans. Kristin L. Jensen, Releasing Managed Care’s Chokehold on 
Healthcare Providers, 16 ANN. HEALTH L. 141, 147 (2007). But see Luft, supra note 116, at 960–
62 (defining a managed care organization as one that controls the number and type of patient 
services offered, and arguing that PPOs are not part of managed care but are rather a 
discounted version of a fee-for-service model). 
 118. See Luft, supra note 116, at 959 (noting that managed care organizations use their large 
member enrollment to coerce physicians into signing contracts with cost-containment policies). 
 119. Talesh, supra note 9, at 62; see also Richard C.W. Hall, Legal Precedents Affecting 
Managed Care: The Physician’s Responsibilities to Patients, 35 PSYCHOSOMATICS 105, 105 
(1994) (“[M]anaged health care inserts a layer of control between patient and physician. The 
physician’s motives and duties may become confused and suspect in this new context and 
relationship.”). 
 120. See supra Part II.C. 
 121. A survey by the New York Medical Society found that 90 percent of physicians change 
their treatment patterns because of managed care restrictions and 92 percent believe that these 
restrictions are not in patients’ best interests. HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW, HEALTH 
INSURANCE COMPANY ABUSES: HOW THE RELENTLESS DRIVE FOR PROFIT ENDANGERS 
AMERICANS 7 (2009), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/page/-/documents% 
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Some managed care contractual provisions control physician 
behavior directly. For example, without-cause termination clauses 
allow insurers to exclude physicians from their coverage policies for 
failure to adhere to a given cost-containment policy. Failure to adhere 
to a cost-containment policy may be as simple as recommending a 
treatment to a patient that is not covered by the patient’s benefits 
package.122 The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has opined, 
“Physicians can feel a real threat that their patient advocacy will be 
punished by termination from the plan.”123 
Other contractual forms of control are less overt but still affect 
patient care. For example, a physician cannot provide care if an 
insurer denies coverage for the treatment the physician 
recommends.124 Moreover, the utilization review physicians that 
managed care organizations employ often have the authority to deny 
or approve a treating physician’s recommendation with little or no 
role for the treating physician’s input.125 These physicians have the 
authority to deny or approve a treating physician’s recommendation 
without ever seeing the patient in question.126 Thus, physicians 
contracting with managed care organizations often feel a loss of 
control over patient care.127 
 
20for%20download/HCAN%20-%20Health%20Insurance%20Company%20Abuses%20-%20 
Final.pdf. 
 122. Jensen, supra note 117, at 153 (noting that managed care organizations use 
termination-without-cause clauses to restrict the flow of information between physicians and 
patients). 
 123. DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, AMA ADVOCACY RES. CTR., PHYSICIAN 
PRACTICE STRATEGIES: PROTESTING UTILIZATION/MEDICAL NECESSITY DECISIONS 5 
(undated), http://getwell.org/Wihwod/Doc/physstrat.pdf. 
 124. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204–05 (2004) (noting a managed care 
organization’s drug formulary constrains a physician unless a patient can afford to pay a drug’s 
market price outside of a plan); Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas I), 724 A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. 1998) 
(noting that the physician was forced to choose between delaying an emergency hospital 
transfer until the HMO approved his hospital referral, or transferring the patient without 
approval at his own expense); see also Luft, supra note 116, at 963 (noting that managed care 
organization formularies constrict physicians in the drugs they prescribe). 
 125. AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT 42 (4th ed. 2005). 
 126. See Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, 16 
HEALTH AFF. 34, 43 (1997) (noting that “utilization review organizations with high levels of 
physician control were particularly willing to interfere with practicing physicians’ autonomy” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 127. Luft, supra note 116, at 964 (attributing physicians’ negative reaction to managed care 
to perceptions of loss of control); see also David S. Brody & Pamela Brody, Managed Care and 
Physician Burnout, 5 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS, Sept. 2003, http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2003/09/ccas3-0309.html (noting that managed care organizations often dictate how 
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Externally imposed control over treating physicians is 
demeaning128 and can lead to “burnout,”129 which negatively affects 
care in pervasive ways. Doctors Brody and Brody define burnout as 
frustration from managed care policies that results in “emotional and 
physical exhaustion, a sense of alienation, cynicism, negativism, and 
detachment to the point that the physician begins to resent work and 
the people who are associated with it.”130 They estimate that up to 40 
percent of physicians experience burnout and exhibit a wide range of 
symptoms, including anger and irritability; excessive complaining; 
blaming annoyances on external factors; becoming introverted, 
isolated, and withdrawn; overeating; abusing alcohol or drugs; or 
experiencing chronic physical symptoms.131 These symptoms and the 
underlying frustration that causes them negatively affect patients as 
well as doctors. Patients of physicians experiencing burnout are less 
likely to adhere to medications and follow-up appointments.132 
Finally, physician burnout may actually counteract the purpose of 
cost-containment policies; physicians exhibiting these symptoms tend 
to make more referrals and use more outpatient procedures than 
physicians satisfied with their work arrangements.133 
Moreover, physicians themselves report that managed care 
decreases the quality of care they are able to administer and 
negatively affects their relationships with patients.134 Bottom-line-
oriented cost-containment policies have considerable impact on 
providers in their practice of medicine, and “conflict with the 
physician’s duty of loyalty to the patient.”135 Furthermore, managed 
care’s effect on physician decisionmaking is so pervasive that it also 
affects treatment decisions for patients covered by traditional fee-for-
service policies.136 For example, one study comparing the care 
 
many patients physicians must see per hour, thus controlling even the style of interaction 
between the physician and patient). 
 128. See Luft, supra note 116, at 962–63 (arguing that a physician’s professional opinion is 
diminished when managed care organizations require that a nurse or clerk provide preapproval 
for medical decisions about treatment). 
 129. Brody & Brody, supra note 127. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Jensen, supra note 117, at 148. 
 136. Under a fee-for-service policy, an insurer reimburses a provider without reviewing the 
appropriateness of the treatment prescribed. 
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resulting from managed care as opposed to fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries found that increases in managed care’s overall market 
share was associated with decreased health care costs for all patients, 
regardless of insurer.137 In other words, by subjecting physicians to 
utilization review oversight, managed care organizations change the 
way physicians treat patients.138 Thus, although cost-containment 
policies are necessary to curb the unsustainable growth in health care 
spending, they must be carefully circumscribed to avoid negating the 
benefit that well-trained physicians bring to health care. 
B.  Bearing Responsibility for All 
Although managed care organizations exert authority over the 
physician’s utilization patterns and exercise discretion in determining 
which prescribed treatments to cover, the physician ultimately retains 
all responsibility for the patient’s well being. When a patient suffering 
from the consequences of denied coverage seeks a legal remedy, the 
physician will inevitably be named as a defendant—with or without 
the insurer. This disconnect between legal responsibility and actual 
control illustrates the inherent problem with the different standards 
of care governing treatment decisions made by practicing physicians 
and insurers.  
The unpredictable and unlikely chance that a beneficiary will 
recover from an insurer for a wrongful denial of coverage creates 
tremendous liability risk for the physician who prescribed the 
treatment. Because ERISA limits beneficiaries’ recovery to the cost 
of benefits denied, harmed patients often sue their treating physicians 
in tort, even if the harm stemmed from the denial of the very care that 
the physician had recommended. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s 
narrow definition of treatment decisions contributes to the frequency 
with which treating physicians are named as defendants in denial of 
coverage actions. As discussed, only mixed decisions survive 
preemption, and avoiding preemption often depends on a finding that 
the treating physician played a role in the utilization review 
decision.139 A plaintiff is therefore more likely to succeed with a state 
law claim against an insurer when the claim directly implicates the 
 
 137. Laurence C. Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health 
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients, 281 JAMA 432, 435 (1999). 
 138. See id. at 436 (hypothesizing that physicians “adopt managed care practice patterns for 
all their patients”). 
 139. See supra Part II.A. 
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treating physician’s actions.140 In other words, patients may state a 
negligence claim against their treating physicians, alleging that the 
failure either to insist on or order a different diagnostic test or 
specialty referral is the cause of the adverse outcome, rather than the 
insurer’s coverage decision.141 
Thus, the ERISA scheme incentivizes wronged beneficiaries to 
reshape their claim into one relating to the quality of care delivered 
by the treating physician, rather than the quantity of benefits 
denied.142 Case law is replete with examples. In one instance, a patient 
had knee replacement surgery and then was denied coverage of the 
post-surgical physical rehabilitation recommended by her orthopedic 
surgeon.143 When her knee failed to recover, she filed a state law claim 
against the insurer and its utilization review nurse for wrongful denial 
of benefits.144 Although she had not sought action against her treating 
physician, she amended her complaint to preserve her state law claim, 
naming the physician as an additional defendant when the insurer 
removed her case to federal court.145 Suing her treating physician 
proved to be the only way to do this: the district court dismissed all of 
the claims against the insurer and remanded the claims against the 
surgeon to state court for litigation.146 
Furthermore, because of the tremendous expense involved in 
litigating a preemption dispute, treating physicians are often the sole 
defendant in an action stemming from harm resulting from the denial 
of coverage.147 Thus, when an insurer denies coverage of care, the 
 
 140. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 252 (“ERISA is not a bar to suing as long as you 
can avoid ‘pleading into the teeth of ERISA’ by taking the ‘square peg of a benefits denial case 
and fitting it into the round hold of a direct liability theory.’” (quoting from the authors’ 
interviews with plaintiffs’ lawyers)). 
 141. David J. Lowe, Avoiding Liability for HMO Denials, PHYSICIANS NEWS DIG., Sept. 
1997, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/997lowe.html. 
 142. “‘[S]mart plaintiffs lawyers’ are learning how to plead their cases to ‘get around 
ERISA,’ by framing almost any scenario as a quality-of-care issue rather than a covered-
benefits issue.” Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 252. Alleging that an insurer negligently denied 
coverage without acting through a treating physician is considered a claim contesting the 
quantity of benefits provided, and is thus subject to ERISA preemption. See supra Part II.A. 
 143. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1485–86. 
 146. Id. at 1484 n.1, 1495 (noting that the district court’s remand of the claims against the 
physician were not appealed, and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the 
insurer). 
 147. See, e.g, Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 251 (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers report that 
it is far easier to name a physician than an insurer in a wrongful denial of coverage action). 
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treating physician could potentially bear all liability. In a landmark 
managed care preemption case, a patient sued the treating hospital 
and physician after his insurer denied coverage of appropriate care.148 
The patient arrived at a community hospital emergency room with an 
epidural abscess.149 Recognizing the severity of the patient’s condition, 
the physician recommended immediate transfer to a larger hospital 
with more specialized staff.150 The patient’s insurer, however, denied 
approval for the transfer, and the consequent delay left the patient 
paraplegic.151 Although the physician and admitting hospital brought 
the insurer into the suit, both were forced into settlement after the 
trial court granted summary judgment against them in their third-
party action.152 
Arguably, allowing treating physicians to be named in tort for 
failing to successfully contest an insurer’s denial of coverage of care 
appropriately incentivizes a physician to advocate for the patient. The 
duty that attaches to the physician when the insurer denies coverage, 
however, is not clearly defined. Consequently, patient care is 
negatively affected by inefficient attempts to avoid unpredictable 
liability risks. Without a shift in liability from the provider to the 
managed care organization for the refusal to cover physician-
recommended care, physicians are burdened with a risk that is both 
uninvited and unavoidable.153 
 
 148. Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas II), 768 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Pa. 2001). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1092 n.2. 
 153. Compare Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 186, 197 (Wis. 
2008) (finding that denial of coverage of the experimental treatment was arbitrary and 
actionable when the physician providing the second opinion recommended radiation and 
chemotherapy because the patient’s health plan excluded coverage of clinical trials), with 
Emerson v. Med. Mutual of Ohio, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3512, 2004-Ohio-3892, ¶¶ 20–36 (Ct. 
App. July 23, 2004) (dismissing all claims against an insurer because the patient’s coverage 
excluded experimental treatments). These cases both involve allegations of wrongful denial of 
coverage for experimental cancer treatment. The fact that the courts came out differently on 
whether treatment was covered by the plans’ terms indicates that physicians cannot predict 
when a coverage decision will result in liability, on the part of either the managed care 
organization or the physician. Although neither patient accepted treatment from the physicians 
recommending the covered treatment, it cannot be said that had they done so, the treatment 
would not have been actionable. In Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182 
(Wis. 2008), the court noted several times that the external review board had concluded that the 
experimental cancer treatment was, in fact, the standard of care applied to a child. E.g., id. at 
185. Thus, had Summers accepted treatment from Dr. Maloney and filed suit when radiation 
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Physicians are not only powerless to reverse denials of coverage 
but also must take affirmative steps to minimize their own risk. They 
must invest in both offensive measures to minimize the risk of being 
sued and defensive measures if they nevertheless end up in court. At 
a minimum, physicians must formally protest a plan’s denial of 
coverage for medically necessary care, and should formally indicate to 
their patients how they have done so. The AMA provides physicians 
with form letters to indicate to a plan and to a patient the physician’s 
disagreement with a plan’s denial of coverage or premature hospital 
discharge.154 Precautionary measures range from maintaining 
documentation of every communication made between each patient 
and each patient’s insurer, including a form signed by the patient 
detailing his understanding of the denial of coverage, to investigating 
managed care organizations before entering into a contractual 
relationship as a covered provider.155 Attorneys instruct physicians to 
familiarize themselves with circumstances under which a particular 
insurer is likely to deny coverage. In addition, they counsel doctors to 
understand the appeal process in advance, to join an insurer’s review 
board, to develop relationships with managed care decisionmakers to 
reduce the likelihood that coverage for their patients will be denied,156 
to file multiple appeals until reaching a different and more 
sympathetic claims reviewer, and to submit a colleague’s report 
supporting the recommendation for coverage.157 Moreover, some 
attorneys even recommend that physicians refuse to further treat 
patients who cannot pay out of pocket and are denied coverage for 
the treatment the physician first recommends.158 
Physicians’ inability to minimize the tremendous liability risk 
they bear for insurers’ cost-containment activities directly detracts 
from patient care. When an insurer refuses to cover medically 
necessary care, a physician bears an ethical159 and legal duty160 to 
 
failed, the physician would have faced liability despite her belief that the patient’s coverage 
excluded treatment involving clinical trials. 
 154. See DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, supra note 123, at 3–4 (providing 
physicians with form letters A–C for these purposes). 
 155. Lowe, supra note 141. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Hall, supra note 119, at 116. 
 158. Id. 
 159. The AMA imposes an ethical duty on physicians to “advocate for any care . . . [that] 
will materially benefit their patients.” AMA, Code of Ethics Op. E 8.13 (1996). 
 160. This duty first amounted to a legal duty in Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
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appeal the insurer’s decision. Physicians are often liable for their 
failure to make such an appeal even when a claim against the 
managed care organization is not preempted.161 Although the 
physician’s ethical duty to appeal a denial of coverage is unavoidable 
(physicians are ultimately responsible for the patient’s care), the legal 
duty is problematic for three reasons. First, physicians have neither 
the time nor the legal expertise to interpret the terms of a patient’s 
coverage to determine whether an appeal of a coverage decision is 
either justified or worthwhile. A physician who does not understand 
the terms of a plan could waste a great deal of time appealing 
coverage decisions that are contractually justified. Second, physicians 
may apply a different standard of care than a plan exercises in making 
a medical necessity determination (because not all plans apply 
community standard of care measures when making coverage 
determinations),162 and thus cannot necessarily determine when a plan 
has wrongly denied coverage. Third, physicians burdened by the 
appeal process reallocate time from providing patient care to filing 
appeals. When potential liability shifts from physicians to the 
managed care organization, however, insurers are much more likely 
to apply medical criteria in making coverage determinations, even if 
not legally bound to do so.163 
Physicians face tremendous liability risk for the cost-containment 
activities of managed care organizations—and yet they are effectively 
powerless to minimize these activities. By holding managed care 
organizations to a uniform standard of care in making coverage 
decisions, physicians could prescribe necessary treatment, file quick 
and timely appeals of any denial of coverage (if necessary), and move 
on to treat the next patient, without being preoccupied by the risk of 
 
 161. See James River Corp. v. Bolton, 14 So.3d 868, 875 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (“[I]t would 
be incumbent upon the doctors treating [the plaintiff], as providers, to appeal the denial of 
medical treatment.”). 
 162. Compare Summers v. Touchpoint Health Plan, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 182, 200 n.20 (Wis. 
2008) (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standard of care to which the physician is 
bound is irrelevant to the determination that a policy does or does not cover treatment, and that 
the majority violated the “primary rule of ERISA-governed plans” in reasoning otherwise), with 
Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[A] standard of 
medical necessity significantly at variance with the medical standards of the 
community . . . . frustrat[es] the justified expectations of the insured, [and] is inconsistent with 
the liberal construction of policy language required by the duty of good faith.”). 
 163. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 265 (“[T]he need to defend coverage decisions in 
court has caused health plans to rely more on objective medical criteria that can be documented 
in the medical literature, rather than on the subjective opinion of medical directors.”). 
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liability and without fear that the patient is forgoing necessary care. 
Furthermore, upon a denial of coverage, a physician could 
recommend and provide an alternate treatment rather than turn the 
patient away in fear of liability. 
Several courts have explicitly pointed to the discrepancy between 
a physician’s actual authority and legal responsibility. For example, 
the Southern District of New York noted that a plan administrator—
after prospectively denying coverage of the prescribed treatment—
instructed the beneficiary’s physician that, “Regardless of our 
decision you and the patient have the responsibility for determining 
the appropriateness of treatment.”164 The Fifth Circuit referred to 
similar language appearing in a plan’s written policy.165 Requiring 
precertification for certain procedures, the policy provided that 
“When reading this booklet, remember that all decisions regarding 
your medical care are up to you and your doctor.”166 Immediately 
below this clause, the policy sets forth the monetary penalties that 
attach for failure to follow the plan’s precertification decision.167 
Thus, because managed care organizations exert tremendous 
authority over the care provided by physicians but escape tort liability 
in doing so, they assume the ability to control treatment without any 
of the corresponding responsibility. 
IV.  STRUCTURING A STANDARD OF CARE TO INCENTIVIZE 
REASONABLE CARE WITHOUT DETERRING 
COST-CONTAINMENT ACTIVITIES 
The conflicting standards of care that govern the treatment 
decisions of practicing physicians and insurers are antithetical both to 
a sense of justice and to the goal of managed care—providing low-
cost and high-quality health care. Several commentators and 
professional organizations have proposed remedial schemes to 
address ERISA preemption. But none have resulted in change, nor 
have they addressed the problem as one of irreconcilable liability 
regimes. This Part does not purport to offer a comprehensive 
solution, but rather suggests that a first step in reforming managed 
 
 164. Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., No. 00 Civ.8101 JSM, 2003 WL 
22019833, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003) (quoting a letter from the doctor who had performed 
the utilization review). 
 165. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 166. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 167. Id. 
RECORD IN FINAL READ 1/15/2010  2:07:37 PM 
2010] WIELDING THE WAND 987 
care liability is to align the legal standards that govern treatment 
decisions in all phases of care. Section A provides a review of the 
problems that emerge from the application of two different standards 
of care to decisions that lead to the same result—the provision or 
denial of medical care. Section B then reviews three attempts to 
address these problems, none of which has proven successful. Finally, 
Section C argues that only by aligning these legal standards can 
effective reform be initiated. 
A.  To Treat or Not to Treat: One Decision, Two Standards of Care 
The different standards that govern insurers’ coverage decisions 
and practicing physicians’ treatments are antithetical both to a basic 
theory of the law and to the goal of delivering high-quality care at a 
sustainable cost. 
1. Confusing Causation and Eliminating Deterrence.  Allowing 
insurers to escape tort liability for wrongful denial of coverage defeats 
two basic principles of civil liability—that a plaintiff may seek 
recovery from the party that caused the harm, and that the remedy 
may deter future wrongs. 
First, the gap between the tort and contract theories of liability 
that are applied to physicians and insurers creates an inconsistency in 
the legal theories plaintiffs can plead in court. Because harmed 
patients can seek greater remedies in tort than in contract,168 they are 
more likely to sue their physicians for wrongful denials of coverage.169 
The very fact that the law allows a wronged beneficiary to name a 
treating physician as a defendant is inconsistent with the basic 
causation principles in tort—the treating physician simply did not 
cause the patient’s harm.170 
Second, and more importantly, applying contract law to 
utilization review decisions fails to deter negligent coverage denials. 
Unbound by the professional ethics governing physicians,171 insurers 
 
 168. Payton v. Aetna/US Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *7 (Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (“[A] recovery in tort may well be greater than a recovery based merely on 
the contract claim, which may be limited to recovery of the premiums paid . . . .”). 
 169. See supra Part II.C. 
 170. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a cost-
containment policy is the proximate cause of the injury if it affects physician judgment). 
 171. See Gray, supra note 126, at 40 (“[E]thical standards are not well established in the 
managed care industry and devote little or no attention to the problems addressed by the 
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administering utilization review procedures need explicit incentive to 
act in the best interest of the patient. Inappropriate denials of 
coverage are extremely common. In 2007, for example, Blue Cross 
Blue Shield Association (“BCBS”) and twenty-three of its affiliates 
agreed to settle allegations of conspiracy to reject or delay claims for 
medically necessary covered services, among other things.172 BCBS 
will pay out over 131 million dollars173 and will adopt new contract 
provisions, including the AMA’s recommended definition of “medical 
necessity.”174 
In contrast, tort liability would deter managed care organizations 
from negligently denying coverage of care.175 Threatened with liability 
for compensatory and punitive damages, rather than merely the cost 
of benefits denied, insurers tempted to increase profits through 
aggressive utilization review would first consider the steep cost of a 
judgment in tort.176 
2. Undermining Cost-Containment.  The law’s disparate 
treatment of insurers and treating physicians is not only antithetical to 
a basic sense of justice but also to the practical and highly relevant 
goals of delivering quality care at a reasonable cost. 
Managed care organizations contain costs by reducing utilization 
of health care services.177 They successfully reduce utilization by 
 
fiduciary ethic, particularly the conflict-of-interest problem and its resolution in favor of the 
patient.”). 
 172. See Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint at 65–68, Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Ass’n, No. 03-21296 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2003) (alleging conspiracy, among other things); Order 
Approving Settlement Among Certain Blue Parties and Physicians, Physician Groups, and 
Physician Organizations, Certifying Class, and Directing Entry of Final Judgment, Love v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 03-21296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2008) (approving settlement of class 
action complaints). 
 173. Order Approving Settlement Among Certain Blue Parties and Physicians, Physician 
Groups, and Physician Organizations, Certifying Class, and Directing Entry of Final Judgment, 
supra note 172, at 5. 
 174. PRACTICE MGMT. CTR., AMA, HOW THE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT HELPS THE PHYSICIAN PRACTICE (2008), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/ 
upload/mm/368/bcbsflyer.pdf. Health Care for America NOW provides multiple examples of 
egregious denials of coverage. See HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW, supra note 121, at 7 (pointing 
to eight instances of penalties imposed by state departments of insurance and four examples of 
state attorney general investigations, all for wrongful denials of coverage). 
 175. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 266 (“Liability . . . affects how health plans 
exercise the discretionary authority they may have to deviate from contractual coverage 
limitations.”). 
 176. Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 300. 
 177. Baker, supra note 137, at 435. 
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carefully drafting contractual provisions that theoretically eliminate 
repetitive, unnecessary, or ineffective care.178 The ERISA preemption 
scheme, however, incentivizes states to require insurers to provide 
more than a plan’s terms, which ultimately defeats the cost-
containment purpose of managing health care. For example, in Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila,179 the Supreme Court explicitly stated that 
ERISA preempts recovery under a Texas law requiring health plans 
to exercise ordinary care in the administration of benefits because 
“[t]he duties imposed by the [state law] . . . do not arise independently 
of ERISA or the plan terms.”180 In other words, the state law could 
survive preemption only by imposing liability for failure to provide 
coverage for treatment that was not covered by the terms of the 
plan.181 Thus, for a state law to govern coverage decisions made by 
employer-sponsored health plans, liability must attach for denial of 
extracontractual benefits. Such legislation, however, would be 
antithetical to the cost-containment efforts of the managed care 
movement. 
Protecting insurers from tort actions for their wrongful denials of 
coverage is also deleterious to the quality of managed care. Imposing 
liability for negligent coverage determinations incentivizes reasonable 
care in making these determinations182 and would help reduce tension 
between the physicians providing care and the insurers challenging 
their treatment decisions.183 Physicians may always share a “collective 
nostalgia for a simple world of doctors know best,”184 but they will be 
far more amenable to industry reform that strongly discourages cost 
containment that is detrimental to patient care. Imposing a standard 
of care on insurers would “lead to system-wide improvements”185 in 
 
 178. See, e.g., Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20, at 593 (describing the ability of the managed 
care contract to reduce both moral hazard as well as physician initiated unnecessary care). 
 179. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 180. Id. at 212–13. 
 181. Id. 
 182. For a discussion of the deterrent value of managed-care liability for negligent coverage 
denials, see Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1968–77. 
 183. This suggestion assumes that physicians’ strong resistance to managed care’s 
assumption of the utilization review function is attributable to the lack of liability attaching to 
an insurer’s denial of coverage that is harmful to patient health. This tension could ease as 
liability is reallocated. Not all commentators accept this explanation for physician hostility 
toward managed care. For an excellent argument that physicians reject third-party payer cost-
containment efforts for professional reasons, see Richman, supra note 24, at 1736–37. 
 184. Id. at 1736 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 270. 
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overall cost-containment efforts, incentivizing managed care 
organizations to utilize clinically based standards in making coverage 
determinations.186 This would result in better patient care at a lower 
cost—reflecting the systems-approach to quality improvement 
promulgated by the Institute of Medicine almost a decade ago.187 
B.  Patchwork Proposals 
The problems created by ERISA preemption of challenges to 
denied health care benefits are extensive and entrenched in the legal 
landscape governing insurers. Both academics and professional 
associations have proposed potential remedies to the problem, which 
this Section groups into three categories. These proposals have fallen 
on deaf ears in Congress. The strengths—and weaknesses—of these 
proposals are instructive to the effort to align the standards of care 
governing treatment decisions of insurers and practicing physicians. 
1. Imposing Ethical Standards on Managed Care Organizations.  
First, several attempts have been made to impose ethical standards on 
managed care organizations. This is directly related to aligning the 
standards of care governing treating physicians and the utilization 
review boards that scrutinize their recommendations. For example, 
the American Association of Health Plans promulgated a 
“Philosophy of Care” mission statement, providing that “patients 
should have the right care, at the right time, in the right setting.”188 
Ethical standards are also imposed on insurers: the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (“NCQA”) created the 
“Accreditation Standards for Managed Care,” requiring insurers 
seeking accreditation to adopt a statement of beneficiaries’ rights and 
responsibilities that includes access to information, available 
grievance procedures, and confidentiality standards.189 The NCQA 
could go even further, requiring insurers—like hospitals—to construct 
 
 186. Id. (“Managed care organizations might be encouraged to select skilled and careful 
clinical decisionmakers, supply them with proper information and tools, assign them to areas 
within their expertise, and monitor their performance.”). 
 187. Using liability to incentivize managed care organizations to implement systems 
designed to reduce error would lead to far greater quality improvement in patient care than can 
be attained through individual physician malpractice liability. See Noble & Brennan, supra note 
37, at 297 (“[B]y holding the ‘enterprise’ accountable through liability, courts may create an 
impetus for MCOs to implement systems with patient safety in mind.”). 
 188. Gray, supra note 126, at 40. 
 189. Id. at 39–40 (suggesting that the NCQA make accreditation contingent on the adoption 
of additional fiduciary language). 
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financial incentives in such a way that “protects the integrity of 
clinical decisionmaking.”190 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) already imposes a similar standard on the health 
plans with which it contracts, prohibiting any physician contract from 
attaching a financial incentive to the reduction or limitation of 
medically necessary care.191 
Although these pledges encourage health plans to at least 
superficially operate on ethical grounds, they do not impose any real 
requirements on insurers—and importantly, they do not require the 
insurer to adhere to the “best interest of the patient,” as treating 
physicians are required to do.192 Notably, the law that does impose a 
legally binding fiduciary duty on insurers—ERISA—does not allow a 
meaningful remedy to attach when this duty is breached, and has 
proved to be minimally effective in incentivizing ethical 
administration of benefits.193 
2. Uniform Standards of Care.  A second proposal to remedy the 
legal vacuum that governs coverage decisions is to impose a uniform 
standard of care on the processes that managed care organizations 
follow in making coverage determinations.194 This approach purposely 
circumvents plaintiffs’ attempts to apply state tort law to managed 
care organizations, and instead creates a unique standard to account 
for insurers’ function in containing costs and allocating resources. 
 
 190. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations imposes this 
accreditation requirement on hospitals. Scott, supra note 48, at 288. 
 191. See id. at 288 n.135 (noting that the Civil Monetary Penalties Law requires that insurers 
providing benefits to Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries may only operate physician incentive 
plans relating to those patients if “[n]o specific payment is made directly or indirectly under the 
plan to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary 
services” (alteration in original) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1998))). Notably, ERISA does 
not preclude insurers from attaching financial incentives to physician utilization of care, but 
rather requires full disclosure of any such arrangement. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 
(8th Cir. 1997) (“When an HMO’s financial incentives discourage a treating doctor from 
providing essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan benefit structure, 
the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties.”). 
 192. Gray, supra note 126, at 39–40. 
 193. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 232 (2000). 
 194. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 288–89 (suggesting that “the development of 
a procedural standard of care as a means to assess the conduct of a managed care organization 
implementing a cost-quality tradeoff through a clinically based coverage determination”). 
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Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall have set forth a “reasonable” 
process standard that would exclusively and directly govern 
utilization review procedures.195 Under this standard: 
A managed care organization would be liable for its share of a 
patient’s injury caused by an incorrect coverage denial only if the 
plaintiff proved that the applicable cost containment procedure was 
(a) not designed to acquire and consider relevant clinical factors or 
to base coverage determinations on one or more sources of 
externally developed, scientifically valid, current medical 
information, or (b) the cost containment procedure otherwise 
meeting (a) was not implemented substantially according to its own 
terms, and (c) the coverage determination was the proximate cause 
of plaintiff’s harm.196 
Others have proposed additional process standards that might 
directly apply to the utilization review process. For example, the 
AMA has asserted that the law should require a licensed physician, 
specialized in the relevant area of medicine, to make a final denial of 
coverage.197 
A process approach is advantageous because it avoids the pitfalls 
of tort law. Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall caution against 
applying the professional medical standard to utilization review 
processes for several reasons.198 First, traditional medical malpractice 
standards of care are generally simplistic and ambiguous—requiring, 
for example, that a physician apply “ordinary care.”199 A process-
based standard designed explicitly for utilization review, on the other 
hand, could provide explicit guidelines for avoiding liability.200 
Second, a medical standard of care would subject a managed care 
organization to “[e]xcessive second-guessing of the substance of 
coverage decisions [which] could over-deter insurers’ socially 
 
 195. Id. at 292. 
 196. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 197. See DIV. PHYSICIAN & PATIENT ADVOCACY, supra note 123, at 5 (“[S]tate law may 
also require that final adverse determinations be issued by a licensed physician that specializes 
in the area relevant to the requested service or treatment.”). 
 198. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 285. 
 199. Id. at 297–98. 
 200. See id. at 298 (“A process standard would hold managed care organizations liable for 
consequential personal injury if, in determining health insurance coverage based on medical 
criteria, they use a procedure that is not designed to acquire and consider relevant clinical 
factors, or if they depart materially from normal procedures without adequate justification.”). 
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beneficial efforts to contain costs.”201 Thus, a process-based standard 
imposes liability for wrongful or negligent coverage denials, but 
affords managed care organizations “reasonable leeway to respond in 
good faith to unusual situations by deviating from normal procedures 
when . . . appropriate,” so long as the elements of the standard are 
met.202 
3. Enhancing Patient Rights.  Finally, a third type of remedy to 
minimize the wrongful denial of coverage empowers patients to 
advocate for themselves. First, insurers can be required to implement 
and adhere to better appeal processes so that patients may effectively 
contest coverage decisions. Second, insurers can be required to use 
unambiguous language in enrollment applications so that potential 
beneficiaries can select the plan that best approximates their 
anticipated health care needs. 
Insurers managing ERISA health plans are already subject to 
relatively stringent appeal processes requirements, which helps 
ensure that negligent coverage denials are at least reviewed in a 
timely manner, if not reversed.203 Furthermore, most states require 
that health plans allow beneficiaries to challenge a coverage denial in 
an external review process.204 Because the Supreme Court has ruled 
that ERISA does not preempt state laws governing review processes, 
all health plans operating in these states are subject to external review 
requirements.205 The AMA’s Model Managed Care Contract 
advocates that health plans themselves should provide that coverage 
denials will be eligible for due process review by independent peers.206 
Requiring insurers to use plain language terms in their policies 
would allow applicants to enroll in the plan that is most likely to 
 
 201. Id. at 298; see also id. at 287, 295 (noting that a managed care organization should not 
be held liable for honest differences of opinion when it chooses the less protective of two or 
more professionally justifiable courses of action, because in this situation the managed care 
organization is making a resource decision rather than a treatment decision). 
 202. Id. at 293–94. 
 203. The Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration promulgated 
these rules. For a description of the requirements placed upon insurers to ensure a timely appeal 
process, see AMA, supra note 125, at 43–44. 
 204. Id. at 44. 
 205. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 355 (2002). 
 206. See AMA, supra note 125, at 44 (“Section 5.2 of the AMA Model Managed Care 
Contract requires that adverse decisions relating to medical necessity or coverage are subject to 
a due process review that is ultimately decided by independent peers, rather than by the MCO 
in its sole discretion.”). 
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cover potential health care costs.207 More importantly—because it is 
impossible for beneficiaries to predict future treatment needs—clear 
contractual language would deter plans from arbitrarily denying 
coverage. 
C.  Starting with the Basics: Aligning Liability 
Health care reform that focuses on expanding coverage and 
reducing costs will have deleterious effects on quality of care unless it 
is coupled with managed care liability reform. Recovery in tort is 
more meaningful to wronged beneficiaries than is recovery in 
contract,208 and—absent preemption—insurers can be subject to tort 
despite their contractual relationship with beneficiaries.209 The 
problem, then, is that ERISA’s extensive preemption regime 
obstructs the majority of these legal actions. The above proposals 
provide piecemeal approaches to imposing responsibility for coverage 
decisions, but they have not resulted in any legal change. The 
ultimate solution will require Congress to address a fundamental 
discrepancy in health law: physicians and insurers both face legal risk 
that is inversely related to the control they yield over the ultimate 
course of treatment administered to each patient. 
This Section argues that aligning the standards of care such that 
the same standards apply to all treatment decisions—those made by 
practicing and reviewing physicians—should be the foundation for 
much-needed legal reform. This Section must begin with an important 
caveat: aligning the standards of care governing those who make 
treatment decisions does not require expanding tort liability. Indeed, 
medical malpractice actions have unnecessarily complicated the 
 
 207. Several bills currently under consideration promulgate such an approach. For example, 
both the Senate HELP Committee Affordable Health Choices Act and the Senate Finance 
Committee America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 would create a minimum “essential health 
care benefits package” and require all health plans to offer the package. HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., supra note 12, at 19 (comparing the various congressional health reform 
measures on a continually updated basis). 
 208. Payton v. Aetna/US Healthcare, No. 100440/99, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 91, at *7 (Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 22, 2000) (“[A] recovery in tort may well be greater than a recovery based merely on 
the contract claim, which may be limited to recovery of the premiums paid . . . .”). 
 209. Id. (“‘A legal duty independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an 
incident to the parties’ relationship. Certain professionals . . . may be found subject to tort 
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, irrespective of their contractual duties. . . . In 
these instances, it is policy, not the parties’ contract, that gives rise to a duty of [] care.” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (N.Y. 
1992))). 
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practice of medicine, and medical experts have heralded tort reform 
for over three decades.210 Given the failure of the tort reform 
movement to accomplish substantive change, however, and the 
stagnancy of the movement toward enterprise liability,211 this Section 
assumes that Congress is more likely to subject insurers to tort than 
physicians to contract. Holding physicians liable in tort does not 
improve quality of care,212 but a call for tort reform is far beyond the 
scope of this Note. This Note’s discussion of tort liability is limited to 
the discrepancy in liability risk that treating and utilization review 
physicians face. This inconsistency has created problems that are too 
substantial to set aside in the hopes that tort reform will transpire. 
Thus, this Section asserts that utilization review physicians must be 
subject to the same standards of care as treating physicians, but does 
not purport to tout tort as a model—or even adequate—remedy for 
adverse medical outcomes. 
Despite the problems that tort liability presents, many of its 
standards can be easily applied to insurers to incentivize reasonable 
utilization review processes without deterring cost containment. The 
AMA’s Model Managed Care Contract promulgates a definition of 
medical necessity for utilization review that would align with the 
definition to which physicians are held in making treatment 
recommendations.213 Attaching actual liability to this standard could 
 
 210. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: 
Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 504 (2004) (“Tort reform [began in the late 1970s and] 
continued in the 1980’s and the 1990’s . . . .”); Bill Bradley, Editorial, Tax Reform’s Lesson for 
Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 (noting that medical 
malpractice reform has been a constant in congressional debates since the early 1980s). 
 211. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 34, at 1933 (“[Enterprise] liability is essential to the 
provision of optimal medical care . . . .”). 
 212. See, e.g., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 109–11 (Linda T. Krohn, et al. eds., 2000) 
(arguing that the medical malpractice liability regime discourages reporting of error and thus 
inhibits quality control efforts); James Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It 
Doing in Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the 
Health Care Marketplace?, 11 ANN. HEALTH L. 125 (2002) (noting that improving quality of 
care requires a systems approach to medicine which is incompatible with the tort-based 
malpractice system). 
 213. Under the AMA’s model contract, an insurer would have to approve coverage for: 
“Health care services or procedures that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for the 
purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms in a 
manner that is (a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b) 
clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (c) not 
primarily for the economic benefit of the health plans and purchasers or for the convenience of 
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incentivize the exercise of reasonable caution in denying coverage,214 
as well as the administration of an expedient and responsive internal 
appeal process to address denials of coverage.215 These benefits are 
realized even when actual litigation remains minimal, suggesting that 
the threat of liability need not significantly increase costs for 
insurers.216 
Tort liability may deter negligent coverage denials, but it must be 
strictly limited. Imposing unlimited liability, or creating liability risk 
even when coverage is properly denied, could deter managed care 
entities from implementing any cost-containment policies at all.217 
Thus, the application of tort to managed care entities must be limited 
in three critical ways. First, liability cannot attach when coverage is 
unambiguously excluded under the terms of the policy. Second, cost-
effectiveness research must be admissible as evidence that a contested 
coverage decision was reasonable under a cost-containment policy. 
Third, damages for the wrongful denial of coverage must be capped. 
First, liability cannot attach when a policy’s terms unambiguously 
exclude coverage. Dean Agrawal and Professor Hall have argued 
extensively for managed care liability reform, but caution that 
“failure to grant [contractual] exceptions should not be the basis for 
personal injury liability. Tort suits should not become vehicles for 
rewriting coverage documents that are clear and precise.”218 The 
concern that a minimum standard of liability would lead to coverage 
 
the patient, treating physician, or other health care provider.” AMA, supra note 125, at 42. The 
AMA has repeatedly filed amicus briefs in ERISA preemption litigation arguing that questions 
of coverage for medically necessary care must be left to regulation by state malpractice law. 
E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 203 (2004); Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 
538 U.S. 329, 331 (2003); Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 
 214. Interviews with health plan managers and attorneys suggest that the threat of tort 
liability effectively deters negligent denials of coverage. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 
264–65 (noting that plan managers and attorneys report that although the current threat of 
liability is not a major “driver of behavior or change,” it is “‘on the back of their minds’ when 
making coverage decisions” and can cause them “to exercise ‘a lot more caution’ in denying 
coverage,” including consulting “outside expert[s] to back up” coverage determinations). 
 215. Patient advocates note that plans have become “more attentive to coverage disputes” 
since states began passing right-to-sue laws, even though ERISA preempts the application of 
these laws to employer-sponsored plans. Id. at 264–65. 
 216. For example, plan managers and attorneys note that state right-to-sue laws have 
affected their practices but have not actually significantly increased litigation. Id. at 266. 
 217. For an argument that any application of tort to insurers would deter cost-containment, 
see generally Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 491 (1997). This Section proposes that appropriate limitations on liability would 
address the concerns that Danzon raises. 
 218. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 279. 
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approval of extracontractual treatment—out of fear of liability219—is 
unfounded. When a treatment is unambiguously excluded from 
coverage, a health plan will not face liability for denying coverage,220 
nor would a managed care organization face liability for terminating 
coverage upon expiration of a contract.221 Even when contractual 
protections do not apply—that is, when a coverage denial is based on 
a finding that care is not medically necessary222—the threat of liability 
will not pressure managed care organizations to approve all requests. 
The sheer size of managed care organizations allows for prediction 
and spreading of risk that allows for fewer defensive mechanisms than 
physicians utilize.223 
A second critical limitation on managed-care liability is that cost-
effectiveness research must be admissible in court to defend cost-
containment policies when challenged. Cost-effectiveness research 
allows insurers (or any entity trying to achieve cost containment) to 
measure the degree to which a new treatment provides either added 
benefit or lower cost.224 For example, in France, no treatment or drug 
is covered unless it serves one of these purposes.225 Managed care 
 
 219. See id. at 266 (“[D]ue to liability concerns, health plans are more willing to settle 
coverage disputes ‘extra-contractually,’ that is, agree to pay for something they believe is not 
covered by the insurance policy, especially where the patient has already incurred the cost at his 
physician’s recommendation.”). 
 220. See Emerson v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3512, 2004-Ohio-3892, at 
¶ 23 (Ct. App. July 23, 2004) (“[The] treatment was experimental/investigative as defined in the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the HMO Health Ohio policy, and, therefore, it was not 
covered.”). 
 221. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 283 (noting that when a contract expires, the physician 
or hospital may be liable for failing to continue to provide care according to the applicable 
standard to which they are bound, whereas the managed care organization would not face 
liability); see also Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 595 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding a hospital liable for discharging a suicidal patient upon expiration of his 
insurance when it was contrary to his physician’s opinion). 
 222. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 279 (noting that liability may attach for coverage 
determinations that hinge on judgments of whether a treatment is “medically necessary, non-
experimental, non-custodial [or] non-cosmetic”). 
 223. Id. at 270–71 (arguing that because of this ability to predict and spread risk, managed-
care liability would likely not result in the defensive approval of claims in the way that physician 
liability results in the defensive practice of medicine). 
 224. LISA ROCHAIX & BERTRAND XERRI, COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL 
AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH: FRANCE 4–5 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/ 
Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Jul/National-Authority-for-Health-France.aspx. 
 225. Id. at 1. The same is true in many high-income nations. See, e.g., David A. Henry, 
Suzanne R. Hill & Anthony Harris, Drug Prices and Value for Money: The Australian 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 294 JAMA 2630, 2630–32 (2005) (describing the efficacy and 
comparative cost-effectiveness analyses applied in the United Kingdom and Australia). 
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organizations could use cost-effectiveness research to design and 
implement far more effective cost-containment policies without 
jeopardizing the health of beneficiaries. Managed care organizations 
rarely use this type of research, however, possibly because its validity 
in courts is widely unknown.226 Because courts have not traditionally 
dealt with cost-effectiveness research,227 legislation creating a uniform 
standard of care would have to expressly provide for the admissibility 
of this evidence. 
Finally, managed-care liability for actions against coverage 
determinations must be subject to federally imposed damage caps.228 
Absence of caps in states with right-to-sue laws has resulted in very 
large (albeit few) punitive awards against managed care 
organizations.229 Although managed care organizations are extremely 
profitable businesses, verdicts that would sink profits would deter 
health plan administrators from exercising any cost-containment 
policies whatsoever.230 
With these limitations in place, subjecting managed care 
organizations to the same tort liability as physicians would not deter 
beneficial cost-containment activity. Imposing liability for the 
negligent denial of coverage imposes a financial burden on managed 
care organizations only when care is wrongfully withheld. Thus, 
managed care organizations that effectively administer cost-
containment policies will experience minimal threat of liability; the 
only plans that would experience financial threat are those that 
wrongfully withhold coverage. In other words, this liability scheme 
would only hurt those plans that do not benefit the health care 
market. Therefore, contrary to the allegation that managed care 
 
 226. Clark C. Havighurst et al., Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 195, 206 (2001). 
 227. See id. at 198 (discussing the “little health care litigation that explicitly involve[s] the 
application of [cost-effectiveness analysis]”). 
 228. Damage caps may be particularly necessary in the managed care arena because of 
society’s negative view of managed care organizations, which is apparent even in judicial 
opinions. See, e.g., Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 238 n.12 (“Not even the judiciary is immune 
from negative views of managed care organizations. . . . ‘[Defendant insurer] behaved like the 
stereotypical HMO, with a beady eye on the bottom line and stony indifference to patient 
welfare.’” (quoting Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 (N.D. Ill. 
2000))). 
 229. See id. at 240 n.16 (noting that verdicts against managed care organizations ranged from 
51 to 120 million dollars). 
 230. See id. at 271 (“The managed care industry . . . cannot serve the resource allocation 
mission assigned to it by society . . . if ERISA preemption were lifted entirely and massive 
punitive awards became commonplace.”). 
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liability would increase consumer costs,231 liability would drive up 
premiums only for those plans facing greater risk because of negligent 
administration of cost-containment policies.232 A minimal standard of 
care would thus improve competition in the coverage market without 
increasing consumer costs.233 
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that a minimum 
standard of care for coverage decisions would expose managed care 
organizations to tremendous amounts of litigation. In fact, states with 
right-to-sue laws have not experienced marked increases in the 
number of suits filed against managed care organizations.234 This may 
be due in part to plaintiffs’ fear of facing an ERISA preemption 
challenge,235 but the absence of an abundance of suits against 
nonemployer-sponsored plans suggests that this fear is not the only 
factor keeping plaintiffs out of the courts. Furthermore, it is not 
litigation itself, but rather the threat of liability, that serves as a 
deterrent to negligent denials of coverage.236 
CONCLUSION 
As health care costs become prohibitive, managed care 
organizations must increasingly perform the utilization review role 
traditionally reserved for treating physicians. Shifting this task from 
physician to insurer allows for effective cost containment, but subjects 
 
 231. See Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 298 (“Likely adaptations [to increased liability] 
include an increase in premiums or a curtailment in benefits to cover the projected costs of 
litigation.”). 
 232. Furthermore, courts have explicitly rejected the argument that the danger of increasing 
consumer costs is a defense to liability. See Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 
N.E.2d 756, 764 (Ill. 1999) (“We disagree with [the defendant-HMO] that the cost-containment 
role of HMOs entitles them to special consideration. The principle that organizations are 
accountable for their tortious actions . . . is fundamental to our justice system. There is no 
exception to this principle for HMOs.”). 
 233. See Noble & Brennan, supra note 37, at 300 (noting that most managed care 
organizations, if acting as “rational economic players,” would avoid significant increases in 
premiums, “either by modifying their managed care techniques to promote quality or by 
eliminating them”). 
 234. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 8, at 275 (“To date, however, there is no evidence of 
the much ballyhooed ‘flood of litigation’ that was predicted . . . .”). 
 235. See id. at 277 (“Uncertainty about ERISA is [one] reason for the absence of state 
litigation under the right-to-sue laws.”). 
 236. See, e.g., id. at 266 (noting that a health care plan “reviewed and improved its processes 
when a managed care liability statute was first enacted in the state because it originally thought 
the statute would produce a lot of litigation. The changes remain in place, even though little 
litigation has ensued.” (emphasis added)). 
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the delivery of care to a second layer of decisionmaking that impacts 
patient outcomes in the same manner as conventional medicine. The 
discrepancy in liability that attaches to treating and utilization review 
physicians has created two incompatible legal standards for the 
delivery of care. 
Extensive federal preemption has created a shield of legal 
protection for employer-sponsored health plans. Potentially liable 
only for the cost of benefits denied, insurers avoid tremendous legal 
risk that would attach under state law—and that does attach to 
affiliated treating physicians. Moreover, these insurers—in efforts to 
achieve cost containment—exert considerable control over 
physicians. Thus, the incongruity between provider and managed-care 
liability has created a system of health care delivery in which only the 
treating physician is subject to externally imposed restraint and legal 
risk. 
Managed-care liability reform is critical not only to providing 
wronged beneficiaries with adequate remedies and to incentivizing 
reasonable care in coverage denials, but also to alleviating physicians 
of the legal responsibility arising from insurer conduct. Legislators 
could spur this reform simply by aligning the standards governing the 
two parties that bear tremendous control over the delivery of care. 
